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The Grand Jury Subpoena: Is It the Prosecutor's
"Ultimate Weapon" Against Defense Attorneys
and Their Clients?
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself as a defense attorney representing a client who is
under criminal investigation by a federal grand jury. The grand jury
serves you with a subpoena requiring you to appear before it and to
bring with you all records concerning any legal fees, expenses, or
other monies you have received from or on behalf of your client. Or
as a second possibility, imagine that you are requested to testify
before the grand jury as to the identity of your client. You anticipate
that by revealing your client's name, you may, in fact, be implicating
the client; in criminal conduct. For instance, the disclosure of the fact
that your client has paid you a large fee in cash could be incriminat-
ing if the client was prosecuted for tax evasion or for other criminal
offenses under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
Act ("RICO"). 1 If you were in these two situations, what would you
do? If you comply with the subpoena in either scenario, would you
be breaching the attorney-client privilege? Will your client have
been denied his sixth amendment right to counsel of his own choice
if you testify and thereafter withdraw from the case? Lastly, if your
client is subsequently indicted upon criminal charges, will your attor-
ney fees, which you testified as having been received from your cli-
ent, become subject to a government-initiated forfeiture action?
These questions are not of recent origin. In fact, they have been
the subject of much concern by defense counsel for at least ten
years.2 Today, however, these questions have gained renewed inter-
est. They have emerged at the center of a growing and heated debate
between prosecutors and defense counsel.3 The debate may have
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 (West Supp. 1985).
2. For early cases, see United States v. Jones, 517 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1975) (grand
jury subpoena to attorneys to testify as to the names of persons who had paid their
client fees); In re Michaelson, 511 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1973), (grand jury subpoena to at-
torney to testify as to his fee arrangement with his client) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978
(1975); In re Stolar, 397 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (grand jury subpoena to attorney
to testify as to his client's home and work address and telephone numbers).
3. See, e.g., Moscarino & Merkle, Are Prosecutors Invading the Attorney-Client
Relationship?, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1985, at 38.
been sparked by a recent increase in the number of attorneys who
have been subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury.4 The increase
in the use of the subpoena in turn can be attributed to three main
factors. First, a "high priority" of the United States Department of
Justice is the prosecution of drug dealers and organized crime
figures. 5 A second factor is the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
19846 which "increased the government's power to seek forfeiture of
attorneys' fees and all other assets received from illegal acts."7 The
third factor is a provision of the Tax Reform Act of 19848 which re-
quires all attorneys to report to the Internal Revenue Service the
name and social security number of any client whose payment to an
attorney is more than ten thousand dollars in cash.9
The use of the grand jury subpoena, as directed to defense counsel,
has been defended on the grounds that requiring an attorney to re-
4. Id. at 39.
5. Id, at 38. See also Robinson, Targeting Lawyers, 7 NAT'L. L.J. 1 (1985).
6. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 1984 U.S. CODE & AD. NEWS (98 Stat.) 1837.
7. Moscarino & Merkle, supra note 3, at 38. But see United States v. Rogers, 602
F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985) (attorney who received funds in return for services legiti-
mately rendered and not as part of sham or fraud to avoid forfeiture was not subject to
forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as
amended by the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984); United States v. Ianniello, 621
F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (similar ruling as in Rogers, that the forfeiture statutes
must be construed to exempt legitimate attorney fees from forfeiture to avoid a viola-
tion of a defendant's sixth amendment rights).
8. 26 U.S.C.A. § 60501 (West Supp. 1985). This section was one of the tax reform
changes included in the Comprehensive Deficit Reduction Act of 1984. This statute
has attracted considerable attention from the legal community. The National Associa-
tion of Criminal Defense Lawyers [hereinafter referred to as NACDL] believes the
provision is a serious threat to the attorney-client privilege as well as the attorney-cli-
ent relationship. See Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., Comments
on Regulations Implementing the Currency Transaction Reporting Law (July 19, 1985)
(unpublished manuscript) (available through the National Ass'n of Crim. Defense
Lawyers, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafter cited as Comments on Regulations].
The American Bar Association has also expressed the "deepest concern" with re-
gards to this regulation. A resolution proposed by the sections of criminal justice and
taxation and approved by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on
February 18, 1985, called for a delay by the Department of Treasury in implementing
the regulation with respect to cash fees received by attorneys for legal services. Nu-
merous other state bar associations throughout the country have expressed similar
concerns. See Comments on Regulations at Exhibits 1-17.
9. 26 U.S.C.A. § 60501 (West Supp. 1985). Any person who receives more than
ten thousand dollars in cash in connection with his business must file a return with
the IRS. The reporting requirement applies if the cash is received in one or more
transactions. The IRS has established form 8300 for reporting these transactions. The
form requires the receiver of the funds to give the following information about the
payor: (1) full name; (2) address; (3) employee identification number; (4) passport
number and country of issuance; (5) alien registration number and country of issuance;
(6) amount of cash received; (7) amount of cash received in the form of $100 bills; (8)
nature of the transaction by general category (i.e., "business services provided"); (9)
description of the property or service involved in the transaction; and (10) method of
payment. Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Serv., Tax Form 8300 (rev.
Jan. 1985).
The recipient of cash must also disclose his or her own name, address, and social se-
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veal a client's identity and/or the legal fee arrangements in most
cases does not violate any attorney-client privilege.10 As additional
argument, the sixth amendment is not infringed if the subpoenaed
attorney resigns from the case because a defendant is always entitled
to appointed counsel. With regard to the forfeiture of attorney fees, a
prosecutor would claim that since "a defendant cannot obtain a Rolls-
Royce with the fruits of a crime, he cannot be permitted to obtain the
services of the Rolls-Royce of attorneys from these same tainted
funds."11 In other words, when a defendant has no legal assets from
which to pay an attorney, the defendant is entitled only to court-ap-
pointed counsel, not counsel of his own choice.
Furthermore, a form of "subtle" corruption is at play when a de-
fense attorney accepts "hundreds of thousands of dollars from a cli-
ent who assuredly did not earn the money punching a time clock on
the 9-to-5 shift. '12 An attorney should not be allowed to act as a
"dirty money launderer."13 Nor should a lawyer simply close his
eyes to the "probable origin [i.e. criminal conduct] of the astronomi-
cal retainer paid. .. "14 The seduction of a defense attorney by the
"narco-do'lar"'5 will erode the integrity of both the defense bar and
the criminal justice system as a whole.
Defense! attorneys agree that the attorney-client privilege should
never be used to promote or further criminal activity. However, they
argue that in many cases, the subpoena directed to defense counsel is
used as a form of intimidation. It is this type of intimidation that
jeopardizes the attorney-client relationship. 16 The defense bar has
repeatedly argued that the lack of United States Justice Department
curity or employee identification number and must sign the form under the penalty of
perjury. Id.
Finally, the IRS has issued a press release stating that a willful failure to file a re-
turn or form 8300 may result in criminal prosecution for a misdemeanor. Department
of the Treasuary, Internal Revenue Serv., Public Affairs Department News Release No.
IR-84-132, Dec. 20, 1984.
10. Moscarino & Merkle, supra note 3, at 39. Merkle is the United States Attor-
ney for the Middle District of Florida.
11. Lawyers Called Organized Crime 'Life Support,' N.Y.L.J., March 11, 1985, at 1,
col. 2, quoted in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United
States), 605 F. Supp. 839, 850 n.14 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
12. Moscarino & Merkle, supra note 3, at 39.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 40.
16. Id. at 39. Moscarino is the Chairperson of the Grand Jury Committee of the
ABA Criminal Justice Section.
guidelines17 and a general insensitivity by prosecutors -toward the
defendant's attorney-client privilege are seeds for potential
prosecutorial abuse. Additionally, the fear of the forfeiture of attor-
17. Guidelines on the issuance of subpoenas to attorneys were established by the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York in 1985. The
full text of the guidelines reads:
Because the attorney-client relationship is an important public interest, the
prosecutorial power of the government should not be used in such a way that
it unnecessarily impairs that relationship. In balancing the concern that the
United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York has for
the integrity of the attorney-client relationship and the office's obligation to
the fair administration of justice, the following guidelines shall be adhered to
by the United States Attorney's Office for the Southern District of New York.
(a) In determining whether to request issuance of a subpoena to an attorney,
the approach in every case must be to strike the proper balance between the
public's interest in the attorney-client relationship, and the public's interest in
effective law enforcement and the fair administration of justice.
(b) All reasonable attempts should be made to obtain information from al-
ternative sources before considering issuing a subpoena to a member of the
bar.
(c) Negotiations with the attorney shall be pursued in all cases in which a
subpoena to a member of the bar is contemplated. These negotiations should
attempt to accommodate the interests of the trial or grand jury with the inter-
ests of the attorney and client. Where the nature of the investigation permits,
the government should make clear what its needs are in a particular case as
well as its willingness to respond to particular problems of the subpoenaed
party.
(d) No subpoena may be issued to a member of the bar without the approval
of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.
(e) In requesting the United States Attorney's authorization for a subpoena
to a member of the bar, the following principles will apply:
1. In criminal cases, there should be reasonable grounds to believe that a
crime has occurred or is about to occur, and that the information sought is
necessary to a successful investigation or prosecution. The subpoena should
not be used to obtain peripheral, nonessential, or speculative information.
2. In civil cases there should be reasonable grounds, to believe that the in-
formation sought is necessary to the successful completion of the litigation.
The subpoena should not be used to obtain peripheral, nonessential, or spec-
ulative information.
3. Unless it would compromise the investigation, the government should
have unsuccessfully attempted to obtain the information from alternative
sources.
4. Even subpoena authorization requests for publicly disclosed information
should be treated with care to avoid claims of harrassment.
5. Subpoenas should, wherever possible, be directed at material informa-
tion regarding a limited subject matter, should cover a reasonable limited pe-
riod of time, and should avoid requiring production of a large volume of
material. They should give reasonable and timely notice of the demand for
documents.
(f) Failure to obtain the prior approval of the United States Attorney may consti-
tute grounds for an administrative reprimand or other appropriate disciplinary ac-
tion. The principles set forth in this section are not intended to create or
recognize any legally enforceable right in any person.
U.S. Attorney's Office Sets Lawyer-Subpoena Guidelines, CRIM. L. REP., May 1, 1985, at
2100.
The United States Department of Justice has recently established guidelines on
forfeiting attorney's fees. See Justice Department Guidelines on Forfeiture of Attor-
ney's Fees, CRIM. L. REP., Oct. 2, 1985, at 3001, 3001-08 [hereinafter cited as Justice De-
partment Guidelines].
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ney fees may itself chill a defendant's right to effective counsel.18
The possibility that attorneys' fees may be forfeited may also discour-
age attorneys from taking criminal cases where a forfeiture action
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
seems likely.19 The open communication between attorney and client
would likely become threatened by the fear that a subpoena may be
directed at the attorney. The client might even become inherently
more distrustful of his attorney. Such distrust may prohibit the at-
torney from effective fact-finding. 20
How the courts have resolved these conflicting interests may, at
first glance, seem of little interest to a reader not engaged in a crimi-
nal practice. However, any government-imposed limitations upon the
attorney-client privilege, the right to counsel, or attorney fees should
be of concern to all attorneys.21 This comment will examine the re-
cent federal court decisions regarding grand jury subpoenas directed
to defense counsel and the important legal issues raised therein.22
II. THE GRAND JURY SUBPOENA: A GENERAL OVERVIEW
The federal grand jury exists pursuant to the fifth amendment of
the United States Constitution.23 The grand jury has been granted
broad powers to fulfill its constitutional role of investigating crime
18. Moscarino & Merkle, supra note 3, at 40.
19. Robinson notes that:
One of the results of the new scrutiny of lawyers has been an unwillingness
on the part of some attorneys to continue to get involved in the defense of
criminal cases .... 'Representing people under investigation is becoming a
difficult problem,' said New York attorney Gerald B. Lefcourt, who says he
knows lawyers who have turned down cases because they are afraid they will
work for several months and then lose their fees.
Robinson, supra note 5, at 27.
20. Moscarino & Merkle, supra note 3, at 40.
21. It is apparent that, at least with respect to the Currency Transaction Report-
ing Law, counsel other than the criminal defense bar have expressed strong opposition
to the law. For instance, the Board of Directors of the Academy of Florida Trial Law-
yers, by an overwhelming vote, adopted a resolution on June 14, 1985, that recognized
the "devastating effect" of the new reporting requirement upon the attorney-client re-
lationship. The adoption of such a resolution was deemed "significant" since most of
the 2,665 members were civil plaintiff's lawyers. See Comments on Regulations, supra
note 8, at Exhibit 4. The Association's position was that such a requirement would "ef-
fectively require the attorney to become an informant against his own client by divulg-
ing client secrets in violation of state and national codes of ethics." Id
22. This comment is not, however, intended to be an in-depth analysis of the cur-
rent federal forfeiture provisions.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The applicable portion of the fifth amendment reads:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless
on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury .... " Id.
and filing indictments when warranted.24 The subpoena is perhaps
the grand jury's most effective investigative tool. Pursuant to Fed-
eral Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(a), the court clerk issues subpoe-
nas to any requesting party without prior court approval or control.
Before the subpoena is served, the requesting party fills in the name
of the person to whom the subpoena is addressed.25
Courts have accepted grand jury subpoenas to be the "'instrumen-
talities of the United States Attorney's Office or of some other inves-
tigative or prosecutorial department of the executive branch.' "26 In
reality, it is the prosecutor who fills in the subpoena forms without
the actual assistance of the grand jury.27 There is a limit, however,
beyond which a prosecutor cannot venture. He may not use the sub-
poena power to gather evidence without the participation of the
grand jury.28
Although the grand jury has the "right and duty to procure every
man's evidence, the grand jury's powers are not limitless."29 To pro-
tect a subpoenaed party from any misuse, Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(c) provides that a party may motion the court "to quash
or modify the subpoena when compliance would be unreasonable or
oppressive."s0 A motion to quash can also be brought on the grounds
that enforcement of the subpoena would conflict with a privilege or
24. The broad investigative powers of a grand jury were confirmed by the
Supreme Court in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (holding that newsmen en-
joy no privilege not to give their testimony to a grand jury). The Branzburg court
noted an early decision which ruled:
Because [the grand jury's] task is to inquire into the existence of possible
criminal conduct and to return only well-founded indictments, its investiga-
tive powers are necessarily broad. 'It is a grand inquest, a body with powers of
investigation and inquisition, the scope of whose inquiries is not to be limited
narrowly by questions of propriety or forecasts of the probable result of the
investigation, or by doubts whether any particular individual, will be found
properly subject to an accusation of crime.'
Id. at 688 (quoting Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)). For a lengthy dis-
cussion of the grand jury's history and general powers, see David, Lengyel, Manuelian
& Sutko, The Federal Grand Jury: Practice & Procedure, 5 CRIM. L. REV. 177 (1983).
25. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a). It should be clarified that the subpoenas are issued
under the district court's name and for the grand jury.
26. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe (Roe v. United States), 759 F.2d
968, 971 (2d Cir. 1985) (quoting In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85,
90 (3d Cir. 1973)).
27. See 8 J. MOORE, W. TAGGERT & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§§ 6.02[2], 17.06 (2d ed. 1985).
28. See, e.g., In re Melvin, 546 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1976).
29. Doe, 759 F.2d at 971 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1973)).
30. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(a). In determining whether a particular subpoena is un-
reasonable or oppressive, the courts generally consider five factors: 1) the relevance of
the subpoenaed documents to the grand jury's investigation; 2) the particularity of the
request; 3) the length of time covered by the request; 4) the expense of compliance in
light of the size and resources of the subpoenaed party; and 5) the "collateral conse-
quences" of compliance. David, supra note 24, at 224-25.
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constitutional right.31
When a subpoena is directed to an attorney, his client may move to
intervene32 and pursue the motion to quash. In the past, the client
often challenged the subpoena on the grounds that it invaded the at-
torney-client privilege. As will be discussed below, most courts have
rejected such challenges.
III. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
A grand jury subpoena, directed to an attorney and requesting the
identity of a client or fee information, has been challenged by the at-
torney and/or the intervenor-client on the ground that such disclo-
sure would violate the attorney-client privilege. 33 Without doubt, the
invocation of this privilege has been troublesome for the courts. The
attorney-client privilege is a four hundred year old common law right
deemed fundamental to our adversarial process.3 4 The privilege
serves to promote complete disclosure by the client without the fear
that the information may be used against him.3 5 This freedom of
consultation is necessary to secure competent legal advice.36
When the privilege is asserted in the grand jury setting, a specific
conflict of interest problem arises. "Since the attorney-client privi-
lege may serve as a mechanism to frustrate the investigative or fact-
finding process, it creates an inherent tension with society's need for
31. David, supra note 24, at 224-25.
32. A client's motion to intervene is brought under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 24(a), -which provides:
Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action
... (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the
disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately repre-
sented by existing parties.
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a). The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that a client should
be allowed Lo intervene when the attorney asserts the attorney-client privilege. See,
e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1981); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571, 1575 (11th Cir. 1983)).
33. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings Doe v. United States, 754 F.2d 154 (6th
Cir. 1985); In re Shargel, 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
34. In re Grand Jury Proceedings Doe, 575 F. Supp. 197, 199-200 (N.D. Ohio 1983),
affd, 754 F.2d 154 (6th Cir. 1985).
35. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2291 (McNaughton rev.
1961). See also C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE
§ 87 (2d ed. 1972).
36. For a detailed discussion of the history and purpose of the attorney-client priv-
ilege, see Zwerling, Federal Grand Juries v. Attorney Independence and Attorney-Cli-
ent Privilege, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1263, 1280 (1976).
full and complete disclosure of all relevant evidence. . . .,,s The
privilege may thwart or hamper the grand jury's duty to search for
the truth. For this reason, the courts have been given broad discre-
tion to define and shape the privilege.3 8 Furthermore, since the priv-
ilege can be misused, for example, to cloak an illegal or fraudulent
act, a general rule has emerged that a party invoking the privilege
has the burden of proving the existence of the privilege.3 9 An attor-
ney-client relationship will not automatically activate the privilege.
Certain criteria must be fulfilled.40
IV. THE IDENTITY OF A CLIENT
In the case of In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35,41 an at-
torney refused to disclose to the FBI the name of a client suspected
of stealing checks from a corporation.42 The attorney, Durant, was
37. In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447, 451 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
38. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 provides in relevant part:
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or pro-
vided by Act of Congress or in the rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness . . . shall be gov-
erned by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the
courts of the United States in light of reason and experience.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (emphasis added).
Wigmore has commented that "the privilege must be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle." J. WIGMORE, supra
note 35, at § 2291.
39. See, e.g., In re Walsh, 623 F.2d 489, 493 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 994
(1980); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert denied 393 U.S.
1027 (1969). Also, it is well-established that the privilege does not apply where legal
representation was secured in furtherance of intended, present, or continuing illegal-
ity. See, e.g., United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.) cert. denied sub
nom., Jacobs v. United States, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15
(1933).
40. The criteria most commonly cited is as follows:
1. the asserted holder of the privilege is or is sought to become a client;
2. the person to whom the communication was made (a) is [the] member of
the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this commu-
nication is acting as a lawyer;
3. the communication related to a fact of which the attorney was informed
(a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of
securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii)
assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing
a crime or tort; and
4. the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950). See
also J. WIGMORE, supra note 35, at § 2292, which states that:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advi-
sor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose,
(4) made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently
protected, (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8) except the
protection be waived.
Id.
41. 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
42. Id. at 448. An FBI agent visited the attorney, Durant, and explained that the
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subpoenaed to appear before the grand jury. Durant again refused to
name his client and the government immediately moved to have the
district court order Durant to reveal the client's name. Durant ar-
gued: first, that the disclosure would incriminate the client in crimi-
nal conduct; second, that he had no knowledge of the alleged theft of
the checks; and third, that the information could be obtained through
other sources.4 3 The court did not find Durant's arguments persua-
sive and ordered him to identify the client. When Durant refused to
comply with the order, he was held in contempt of court.
While further contempt proceedings were stayed, the prosecutor is-
sued a second subpoena to Durant to appear before the grand jury
with certain documents.4 4 Durant then moved to quash the sub-
poena. He alleged that if he revealed the identity of his client, the
government would have its "last link of evidence necessary to effect
an indictment" 45 of his client. In fact, the attorney specified that not
only would he be implicating his client in criminal conduct, but he
FBI was investigating the theft of several checks made payable to IBM Corporation.
The FBI traced some of the stolen checks to various bank accounts listed under the
names of non-existing organizations. One of the checks deposited was initialed "IBM."
The agent then showed Durant a photocopy of a check drawn upon one of the ficti-
tious accounts. The copy was of a check for fifteen thousand dollars made payable to
the attorney's law firm. Upon FBI inquiry, the attorney conceded that the check was,
in fact, received and endorsed by his firm from a client for legal services. Id.
43. 723 F.2d at 449. Durant stated:
I should add ... there is a substantial number of checks flowing around the
city, all those checks come back to the drawee bank with bank endorsements
on the back. It should be ... equally possible, without violating the attorney-
client privilege, for the agents to find out who presented, who cashed and to
trace the money through normal commercial channels, to say nothing of the
fact that who opens the mail at IBM now obviously becomes of significant
importance.
Id. at 449 ri.1.
44. Id. at 449. The second subpoena read:
A listing of all clients of the law firm of Durant & Durant, P.C., and Richard
Durant ... including all clients with active cases and clients who owe fees or
have provided a retainer to the firm and all client ledger cards and other
books, records and documents reflecting or recording payments to the law
firm for the period....
Id.
45. Id. At the second hearing on Durant's motion, the court was also informed by
Durant that at the first hearing, "the FBI requested, under threat of harrassment, that
Durant 'breach' the attorney-client privilege and identify his client without informing
the client." Id. Footnote 3 explains:
[T]he F"BI agent . .. and I, the U.S. Attorney were outside, and I was given
the proposition that I should tell the FBI the identity of my client, but not tell
my client that I had done so, so that the FBI presumably could move in.
When I rejected what was propositioned ... it was pointed out that I could be
printed and held incommunicado for six or seven hours while the circuit was
... [r.dden] with me, and I implied it was a good thing that I had instructed
would be implicating him in "the very criminal activity for which
legal advice had been sought."46 The lower court withheld judgment
as to both subpoenas until the appeals court resolved the contempt
order.
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis by recogniz-
ing that federal courts "unanimously" 47 agree that the identity of a
client generally is not privileged information.48 However, the court's
discussion did not end there. The court explored several exceptions
to this general "rule."49
The first exception is known as the "Baird rule,"50 which is also
known as the "legal advice" exception. Baird originally stood for the
my office that if they hadn't heard from me by 3:30, to come over here [to
court] with a writ of habeas corpus. I made a phone call.
Id. at 449-50 n.3.
46. Id. at 450. The government had contested the attorney's last assertion by in-
troducing the check into evidence. The notation "corporate legal services" was on the
check which, the prosecutor argued, did not suggest any criminally-related legal serv-
ices. Also, the government pointed out that the check was received by Durant two
weeks before the FBI began its investigation into the stolen checks. Durant rebutted
the government's argument by stating his client did, in fact, discuss the IBM checks
with him. Furthermore, he claimed that the alleged corporations did not exist, and the
notation on the check was a misnomer. Id.
47. Id. at 451.
48. There are three main reasons why client names are not privileged. The first is
that an opposing litigant should not have to "struggle in the dark against unknown
forces." J. WIGMORE, supra note 35, at § 2313. Second, "the privilege presupposes the
attorney-client relationship; therefore, it does not attach to its creation; [and third,] the
court has the right to know that there actually is a client." Comment, Evidence - At-
torney-Client Privilege - The Identity of the Client, 59 Ky. L.J. 229, 233 (1970).
49. Using the word "rule" may actually be incorrect. See, e.g., In re Ousterhoudt,
722 F.2d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 1983). The term is used here only to identify caselaw which
stands for the general proposition that client identity is not privileged.
Two cases most often cited for this general rule are United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1944), and Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 951 (1963). In Pape, a defendant was convicted for transporting a woman in
interstate commerce for immoral purposes. On appeal, Pape claimed the trial court
erred in compelling his attorney to disclose at trial that Pape had retained the attorney
to appear for the prostitute and had paid his fee. In confirming the conviction, the
court held that a retainer was not a confidential communication and that "the prosecu-
tor was entitled to ascertain the full scope of the attorney's employment." Pape, 144
F.2d at 782-83. But see id. at 783-84 (Hand, J., dissenting).
In Colton, a tax attorney refused to answer certain questions propounded by the IRS
as to a client's tax liability. The client's identity was not an issue. The court affirmed
an order compelling counsel to answer questions pertaining to the date and general na-
ture of legal services performed. In so doing, the court held "the identity of a client, or
the fact that a given individual has become a client, are matters which an attorney nor-
mally may not refuse to disclose, even though the fact of having retained counsel may
be used as evidence against the client." Colton, 306 F.2d at 637.
50. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 623 (9th Cir. 1960). In Baird, an attorney sent to
the IRS a cashier's check along with a letter requesting that money be deposited in the
IRS fund for unidentified collection. The IRS then summoned the attorney and de-
manded that he reveal the names of his unidentified taxpayer clients. Baird refused
and was later found in contempt. The appeals court reversed because in this situation
"a disclosure of the persons employing the attorney ... would disclose the persons
paying the tax .. " Id. at 630.
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proposition that a client's name was privileged when the name was
used only to prove "an acknowledgement of guilt [by the client] ...
of the very offenses on account of which the attorney was em-
ployed."51 The Baird rule was later narrowed. A person claiming
the privilege had to show by a "strong probability ... that disclosure
of such information would implicate that client in the very criminal
activity for which legal advice was sought."5 2 The exception has
been logically confined to protect the identity of clients who sought
legal counsel as to past activities that might result in a criminal
indictment.5 3
In decisions subsequent to Baird, the Ninth Circuit misconstrued
the rule54 and caused general confusion as to the exception's true
meaning. Finally, in the case of In re Ousterhoudt,55 the Ninth Cir-
cuit clarified the rule. Under Baird, the privilege applied not because
the identity of the client was incriminating. Instead, the privilege ap-
plied in Baird because "disclosure of the identity of the client was in
substance a disclosure of the confidential communication in the pro-
fessional relationship between the client and the attorney."5 6
The Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35
recognized the Baird exception. However, the court found the excep-
tion inapplicable since attorney Durant failed to meet the "strong
probability" test.5 7 Durant failed to meet this test because he relied
solely upon "blanket assertion[s] that his client had initially sought
legal advice related to" the theft of corporate checks.58 The court
strongly disfavored such an unsupported assertion. Also, Durant's
credibility was diminished by his own testimony. First, he contended
that he did not know anything about the theft of the checks. Later,
51. Id. at 633 (quoting 97 C.J.S., Witnesses § 283e (1957)). Note that the Baird ex-
ception actually originated in the California state courts. See, e.g., Ex parte McDon-
ough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 P. 566 (1915).
52. United States v. Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347, 1353 (9th Cir. 1977) (emphasis
added).
53. Obviously, no social interest is served by protecting the name of a client if the
attorney-client relationship leads to subsequent, unrelated criminal conduct.
54. See. e.g., Hodge & Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977).
55. 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 593.
57. Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 454. Both the first and sec-
ond exceptions were reaffirmed by the Sixth Circuit in In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Gordon), 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3524 (1984).
It is interesting to note that the "strong probability" test was rejected 19 days later
by the Ninth Circuit in In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d at 592.
58. Grond Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 454.
at a second hearing, he claimed his client hired Durant for services
connected with the stolen checks.
The court next considered a second exception formulated by the
Fourth Ciruit.59 Under the so-called Harvey exception, the privilege
is recognized "when so much of the actual communication has al-
ready been disclosed that identification of the client amounts to a dis-
closure of a confidential communication." 60 Although the court
accepted this exception in theory, it summarily dismissed it here sim-
ply because Durant failed to raise it.
The third and final exception considered by the court originated in
the Fifth Circuit.6 1 Under this final exception, known as the "in-
crimination rationale" or "last link" exception, the privilege is recog-
nized when disclosure would provide the "last link" of evidence
which would lead to the client's indictment. The Sixth Circuit de-
clined to adopt this exception based on the reasoning that the excep-
tion was "not grounded upon the preservation of confidential
communications and, not justifiable to support the attorney-client
privilege."62 Although the exception might serve "fundamental fair-
ness against self-incrimination,"63 such a policy was not a "proper
consideration"64 for asserting the privilege. Durant had argued that
once he revealed his client's name, his client would be arrested. Be-
cause the court rejected the incrimination rationale, Durant's claim
was also repudiated and, consequently, the contempt order was
affirmed.
The Sixth Circuit's refusal to follow the incrimination rationale
finds support from the Second Circuit. For instance, in In re
59. NLRB v. Harvey, 349 F.2d 900 (4th Cir. 1965). Attorney Harvey hired a pri-
vate investigator (as requested by Harvey's client) to investigate a union organizer.
The NLRB suspected a furniture manufacturer, the employer of the labor organizer,
was the client. If that were true, the investigation would be contrary to labor law.
The NLRB subpoenaed Harvey to name his client. Harvey responded by affidavit that
the furniture manufacturer was not the client. He refused, however, to specify who
his client was. The court of appeals found that the client's communications, including
those related to hiring the detective, were within the attorney-client privilege if Har-
vey was retained by the client for legal services. But if Harvey was not hired for legal
work, the privilege did not apply. The case was remanded to determine which scenario
was present. Id.
60. Id. at 905.
61. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Pavlick), 680 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1982). See also
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege as a Protection of Client Identity: Can Defense At-
torneys be the Prosecutor's Best Witness?, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 81 (1983).
In Pavlicc an attorney refused to disclose to a grand jury the name of a client who
paid his fee for representing three defendants in a drug conspiracy case. The court
held that the client, the "benefactor," could not be concealed since his identity was not
a last link in any chain of inculpatory events. 680 F.2d at 1029.
62. Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 454 (emphasis in original).
63. Id.
64. Id.
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Shargel,65 attorney Shargel claimed that he was a "prominent crimi-
nal law specialist" and that revealing those clients who consulted
with him would cause him, in effect, to divulge the communication:
"I have a criminal problem. '6 6 The court flatly rejected this argu-
ment. A consultation with a criminal law specialist does not by itself
implicate a client in past criminal conduct. Furthermore, even if
such an inference could be made, "that alone says nothing about guilt
or innocence, about past or future acts, or even about the reasonable-
ness of the [client's] apprehension [about a criminal law problem]."6 7
However, this rationale is weakened by the fact that attorney Shargel
stated in his motion to quash the subpoena that he provided repre-
sentation for clients both before and after the clients were indicted.
These consultations with his clients were also related to the criminal
indictments.
Perhaps by mistake, Shargel volunteered "a connection between
[the] ... clients and the subsequent RICO proceedings .... "68
However, at oral argument, Shargel did clarify that he had only con-
sulted each client individually. Nevertheless, the court recognized
that if the clients had consulted Shargel as a group, a possible infer-
ence of concerted activity amongst the clients could be drawn. Thus,
the court directed the lower court to hold an in camera inspection of
any documents that would support such an inference of group activ-
ity. Shargel was thereafter required to identify his client.69
If nothing more, In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 and In
re Shargel illustrate some practical problems an attorney must face if
he chooses to contest a grand jury subpoena. First, the attorney must
be careful in drafting his supporting affidavits for the motion to
quash. A court may not find an argument credible if the attorney
presents two conflicting sets of facts.7 O Also, if an attorney is repre-
senting more than one client, and if the clients may be, or have been,
indicted upon the same criminal charges, the attorney must take cau-
tion not to create "an inference of confidential communications indi-
cating concerted activity among several clients....
Secondly, an attorney cannot rely upon "blanket assertions" to sup-
65. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
66. Id. at 62.
67. Id. at 64 n.4.
68. Id. at 64.
69. Id. at 65.
70. See, e.g., Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d at 455.
71. Sharge4 742 F.2d at 64.
port his claim of the attorney-client privilege. Instead, the attorney
has the burden of establishing the existence of the privilege. It is his
duty to move for an ex parte, in camera hearing. Thirdly, each cir-
cuit embraces some, or perhaps even none,72 of the three exceptions
discussed above. The attorney must be aware of which exceptions
will be considered in his particular circuit.
Criminal attorneys are not the only lawyers subject to subpoenas
requiring them to reveal their client's identity. For instance, in
United States v. Liebman,73 the Internal Revenue Service issued a
"John Doe summons" to a law firm. The summons required the firm
to produce documents containing the names of clients who had par-
ticipated in a real estate partnership for tax purposes.74 The lower
court ordered the attorneys to provide a list of client names to the
IRS.75 The attorneys appealed on the ground that revealing their cli-
ents' names breached the attorney-client privilege.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with the tax attorneys
and reversed the lower court's order enforcing the IRS summons. 76
The court explained that if the summons had asked only for the
names of the clients the privilege would have been inapplicable. But
the summons described the actual content of the communication be-
tween the attorney and the clients. Specifically, the summons stated
that the "taxpayers ... were advised by ... [the attorneys] that the
fee was deductible for income tax purposes." 77 Thus, the case here
fell within the Harvey exception. In this instance, the actual commu-
nication had already been disclosed. Thus, requiring further disclo-
sure of the clients' names would have completely unfolded the
confidential communication. The court found the tax deduction of a
fee was a "legal matter," and therefore, subject to the attorney-client
privilege.78
The IRS had argued that the privilege should be available only
when the "disclosure of a client's identity would implicate the client
in the matter for which he or she sought advice."79 The IRS claimed
72. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe (Roe v. United States),
759 F.2d 968, 971 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding the attorney-client privilege not applicable to
information relating to fee or fee sources). The Doe court found the case of United
States v. Liebman, 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984), to present "special circumstances." Doe,
759 F.2d at 971 n.3.
73. 742 F.2d 807 (3d Cir. 1984).
74. Id. at 808. The tax attorneys admitted that they told their clients the invest-
ment fee was deductible as a legal expense. The IRS claimed otherwise, and wanted to
find out which client-investors inappropriately deducted the investment fee as a legal
expense. Id.
75. Id. at 808.
76. Id at 810-11.
77. Id. at 809.
78. I& at 810.
79. Id.
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the privilege was invalid since the client was not being implicated in
the matter for which he sought legal advice, i.e., the participation in
the real estate partnership. To the contrary, the IRS alleged that it
was investigating the legality of the deductions.
The court pronounced the IRS argument as "unduly narrow."o It
then commented: "All legal communications entered into with the
expectation of privacy are privileged whatever the initial purpose of
the consultation."81 This broad language suggests that if In re
Shargel and In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35 had been de-
cided in the Third Circuit, the results may have been quite different.
In many instances, revealing a client's name may lead to the cli-
ent's subsequent indictment. However, in one instance, an attorney's
refusal to identify his client caused the attorney to lose what he
claimed to be a one hundred and fifty thousand dollar retainer fee.
In United States v. $149,345 United States Currency,82 attorney
Alonso brought a civil action for return of money seized by the gov-
ernment. However, Alonso refused to disclose the name of his client,
claiming the disclosure might result in the criminal prosecution of
his client "'of the very matter for which . . . [the client] had sought
advice."8 3 The trial court found the client's identity material to
Alonso's claim and ordered discovery. When Alonso still refused to
name his client, his case was dismissed as a sanction. Alonso then
appealed.
While the appeal of Alonso I was pending, the government initiated
a money forfeiture action.8 4 The trial court took judicial notice of
Alonso I and held that Alonso had no standing in the second action to
contest the forfeiture since he did not meet a "threshold requirement
that he ha[d] an interest in the seized property."8 5 The attorney's
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. 747 F.2d 1278 (9th Cir. 1984) [hereinafter referred to as Alonso II]. In an ear-
lier action, A]onso v. United States, No. 82-0898-FW (C.D. Cal. Oct. 29, 1982), 718 F.2d
1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1121 (1984), an airplane passenger from
Florida was stopped by FBI agents at Los Angeles Airport. The passenger consented
to a search and two envelopes were uncovered. The envelopes had inscriptions in
Spanish indicating they were for an attorney named Alonso. When Alonso was later
contacted by the FBI, he informed the FBI that the money was a retainer from a cli-
ent. However, he refused to reveal the client. The money was then seized by the gov-
ernment. Id. at 1279.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1280. See also Alonso v. United States, No. 82-6017 (C.D. Cal., Oct. 29,
1982), aff'd, 7:L8 F.2d 1109 (9th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 104 S. Ct. 3509 (1984).
claim to the money in Alonso II was then dismissed as precluded by
Alonso I.
The court of appeals held that the dismissal of Alonso's claim in
the second action was proper. However, the court recognized
Alonso's "uncomfortable dilemma"86 when Alonso I was dismissed.
The court explained that Alonso had a right to appeal Alonso I upon
the privilege claim, which the court did not find frivolous.8 7 How-
ever, by appealing the dismissal sanction, Alonso gave up his right to
proceed on the merits if he lost.
As an alternative, Alonso could have disclosed his client's identity
and proceeded on the merits. But, by doing so, he would have sur-
rendered the privilege claim and may have exposed his client to crim-
inal liability. Alonso was faced with "Hobson's choice." He was
denied the right to try his case on the merits "unless he foreswore
what he saw as his duty to his client."88 Furthermore, when the for-
feiture action was instituted, Alonso had to disclose his client's iden-
tity so as not to be dismissed from the forfeiture action and, by such
disclosure, would effectively be abandoning his appeal in Alonso I.
From this procedural nightmare, the appeals court ultimately con-
cluded that it was only fair to allow Alonso an opportunity to vacate
the Alonso I judgment8 9 if Alonso would reveal the name of his cli-
ent. However, in the end, Alonso stood firm; he still refused to name
his client and forever lost his attorneys' fees.90
V. DISCLOSURE OF AFORNEYS' FEES
As with the name of a client, attorneys' fee arrangements generally
have not been interpreted by the courts to be privileged. For exam-
ple, in the case of In re Shargel,91 the Second Circuit compelled the
attorney to produce "records of any monies or property" which he re-
86. Alonso I, 747 F.2d at 1280-81.
87. Id
88. Id. The term "Hobson's choice" is commonly used by the courts to explain this
particularly unique situation.
89. This procedure is allowed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), which
provides in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or dis-
charged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the oper-
ation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,
and for reasons (1), (2), or (3) not more than one year after judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
90. Galante, 9th Circuit Upholds Seizure of Legal Fee, 7 NAT. L.J. 3 (1984).
91. 742 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
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ceived from his clients.92 The government sought this information to
prove the clients' "'unexplained wealth,' tax law violations, and pay-
ments of legal fees by 'benefactors.' -9
The Shargel court distinguished legal fees and the identity of a cli-
ent "from communications intended by a client to explain a problem
. ..in order to obtain legal advice."'94 In other words, the disclosure
of any legal payments or other transfers of property from the client
to the attorney did not hinder the "attorney's ability to give informed
legal advice."95 Also, any fees paid by a third party "benefactor"
were subject to disclosure under the Pape ruling.96
Any broad privilege against the disclosure of attorney fees was ex-
plicitly rejected by the court in Shargel. The privilege could "easily
become an immunity for corrupt or criminal acts .... Such a shield
would create unnecessary but considerable temptations to use law-
yers as conduits of information or of commodities necessary to crimi-
nal schemes or as launderers of money."9 7 The court was primarily
concerned with the potehtial corruption of attorneys. It therefore be-
lieved that full disclosure might deter attorneys from taking a bite
from forbidden fruit.9 8
A similar ruling to In re Shargel was reached by the Ninth Circuit
in In re Ousterhoudt.99 There, an attorney represented a client in
connection with a grand jury investigation of possible controlled sub-
stance and income tax violations. The government claimed the date
and amount of legal fees paid by the client was information necessary
to complete their investigation. The attorney relied upon the Baird
rule and invoked the attorney-client privilege. But, the court found
the attorney's reliance upon Baird was misplaced. The court's ration-
ale mirrors that of the Shargel court. The disclosure of the fees did
not "convey the substance of confidential professional communica-
tions"1 00 between the attorney and his client. The information was
92. Id. at 62.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 63.
95. Id. at r'4.
96. United States v. Pape, 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 752 (1944).
See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
97. ShargZ 742 F.2d at 64.
98. U.S. District Judge Marvin E. Frankel expressed a comparable concern: "[W]e
manage as counsel to avoid too much knowledge. The sharp eye of the cynical lawyer
becomes at strategic moments a demurely averted and filmy gaze." Moscarino & Mer-
kle, supra note 3, at 39.
99. 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983).
100. Id. at 594.
not privileged even though it was possibly incriminating.
In re Ousterhoudt and In re Shargel represent a "hard line" ap-
proach to the disclosure of attorneys' fees and client identity. After
these decisions, it is difficult to imagine a situation where Baird or
any other exception might apply. The question then becomes how
much information regarding attorneys' fees the government may be
able to discover. The Ninth Circuit has indicated that a subpoena re-
questing "attorney time records describing the services performed by
the attorney, retainer agreements, contracts, letters of agreement,
and related correspondence," 101 will be struck down. In In re Grand
Jury Witness,102 decided a year before Ousterhoudt, the court held
that the client's ultimate motive for hiring an attorney was privi-
leged, and any documents indicating the client's motivation were
privileged. However, a simple invoice that only indicated the amount
of the fee was not privileged.103
VI. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS REGARDING THE DISCLOSURE OF
CLIENT IDENTITY AND LEGAL FEES
The courts have not been alone in deciding whether the disclosure
of client identity and fee arrangements violates the attorney-client
privilege. Various ethics committees have also considered the is-
sue.104 Under Canon 4 of the ABA Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, an attorney should not reveal client "confidences" or
"secrets." 105 Thus, the disclosure of a client's identity and/or fee in-
101. In re Grand Jury Witness (Salas v. United States), 695 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir.
1982).
102. Id. Privileged documents were held to include: "[B]ills, ledger, statements,
time records and the like which also reveal the nature of the services provided, such as
researching particular areas of law .... Id. at 362.
103. Id. at 362.
104. See, e.g., Philadelphia Bar Association Opinion No. 81-95 (holding that a law
firm could not voluntarily provide the IRS with a list of its clients and the amount
paid by each if the firm validly believed that disclosure would be embarrassing or po-
tentially detrimental to the clients); Connecticut Bar Association Committee on Pro-
fessional Ethics, Informal Opinion No. 81-3 (Oct. 9, 1980) (holding that disclosure of a
client's fund ledgers to an IRS agent auditing a law firm would violate the Code of
Professional Responsibility); Kentucky Bar Association Opinion KBA E-253 (Sept.
1981) (holding that Canon 4's prohibition against the disclosure of client secrets and
confidences extends to the very existence of the attorney-client relationship when the
subject matter of the relationship involves advice about potential criminal liability or
other matters not of public record); Florida Bar Committee on Professional Ethics,
Opinion 62-24 (holding that a lawyer is not permitted to disclose the name and address
of a client to the IRS where the client had the lawyer obtain an IRS ruling on a hypo-
thetical question); Florida Bar Staff Opinion TE085429 (May 15, 1985) (holding that a
real estate lawyer who obtained title to property on behalf of his clients is precluded
from identifying those clients to the IRS in the absence of consent). See also Com-
ments on Regulations, supra note 8, at 33-34.
105. The related Disciplinary Rule 4-101 (B) states:
Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
[Vol. 13: 791, 1986] Grand Jury Subpoena
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
formation may directly conflict with the attorney's ethical duty to his
client. The Committee on Legal Ethics for the District of Columbia
Bar has interpreted this canon in light of the problem concerning dis-
closure of the client's identity.106 The Committee found that "when-
ever a client requests nondisclosure of the fact of representation, or
circumstances suggest that such disclosure would embarrass or detri-
mentally affect any client, the fact of the firm's representation of
that client is a client 'confidence' or 'secret' subject to the protections
accorded by ...Canon 4."1o7 Other state committees have reached
similar conclusions.1os
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence of his client for the advantage of himself or of a third
person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(B) (1979). Disciplinary Rule
4-101 (A) defines "confidence" and "secret" as follows:
'Confidence' refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege
under applicable law, and 'secret' refers to other information gained in the
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the
disclosure of which would embarrass or would be likely to be detrimental to
the client.
Id. DR 4-101(A).
Another applicable ethical consideration is that:
A lawyer should not use information acquired in the course of the representa-
tion of a client to the disadvantage of the client:
The use of the word 'information' in these Ethical Considerations, as opposed
to 'confidence' or 'secret,' is particularly revealing of the drafters' intent to
protect all knowledge acquired for a client, since the latter two are defined
terms. . . Information so acquired is sheltered from use by the attorney
against his client by virtue of the existence of the attorney-client relationship.
This is tre without regard to whether someone else may be privy to it....
The obligation of an attorney not to misuse information acquired in the course
of representation serves to vindicate the trust and reliance that clients place
in their attorneys. A client would feel wronged if an opponent prevailed
against him with the aid of an attorney who formerly represented the client
in the smne matter.
Brennan's Inc. v. Brennan's Restaurant, Inc., 590 F.2d 168, 172 (5th Cir. 1979) (inter-
preting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canons 4-5 (1979)).
106. In Opinion No. 124 (Mar. 22, 1984), the Committee ruled that a law firm
should not voluntarily disclose the firm's clients to IRS auditors. See Comments on
Regulations, supra note 8, at 31-32 for a full discussion of the Committee's opinion.
107. Comments on Regulations, supra note 8, at 4.
108. See su pra note 104 and accompanying text. See also Disciplinary Board of the
State Bar of Georgia, Advisory Opinion No. 41 (Sept. 24, 1984), holding that an attor-
ney should not voluntarily reveal his client's identity to the state revenue department
without the client's consent. Here the state tax authorities tried to obtain the informa-
tion from a criminal attorney who received cash fees over ten thousand dollars on sev-
eral occasions over a three year period. See Comments on Regulations, supra note 8, at
32-33.
VII. THE FUTURE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
There is little doubt that requesting an attorney to testify against
his client before the grand jury raises some serious questions. Be-
sides practical procedural technicalities, an attorney must consider
caselaw, which generally stands for the proposition that client iden-
tity and fee information are not privileged. Two main cases cited for
this proposition, United States v. PapelO9 and Colton v. United
States,lno hold that there may be occasions when this "rule" should
not be followed. Some courts have developed exceptions. Recently,
the trend has been to withdraw from or to simply reject these excep-
tions. Most courts continue to narrowly construe the privilege con-
cept to accommodate the important investigative function of the
grand jury. But is this approach overinclusive? In other words, are
there other means by which the grand jury's powers can be preserved
without jeopardizing the attorney-client relationship? To date, most
courts have answered this question in the negative.
In many instances, the fee information will later become the basis
for a government forfeiture action against the attorneys' fees. How-
ever, no court has considered the forfeiture problem when deciding
the scope of the attorney-client privilege and how it relates to fee in-
formation and forfeiture actions at the grand jury stage. Undoubt-
edly, the criminal defense bar would welcome such an examination
by the courts.', Although information concerning attorneys' fees
may not technically be a "communication" necessary to render legal
advice, an attorney may be unwilling or unable to render any legal
advice without receiving a fee. In this respect, requiring an attorney
to reveal fee information may discourage "full and frank communica-
109. 144 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1944). Pape indicated that there might "be situations in
which so much has already appeared of the actual communications between an attor-
ney and a client, that the disclosure of the client will result in a breach of the privi-
lege." Id. at 783.
110. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963). In Colton, it was
suggested that the privilege may be warranted where "the substance of a disclosure
has already been revealed but not its source." 306 F.2d at 637.
111. The NACDA found Ousterhoudt, in particular, to be "unrealistic." For
instance,
Ousterhoudt's rejection of the 'incrimination standard' is predicated on the as-
sumption that '[i]nformation regarding the fee arrangement ordinarily is not
part of the subject matter of the professional consultation. . . .' [citation omit-
ted] This assertion ignores the Justice Department's contention that attorney
fee payments constitute forfeitable proceeds of illegal activity. In every RICO
and Title 21 case in which legal advice is sought, the amount and method of
payment of attorneys' fees is inextricably intertwined with forfeiture issues
and is quite properly the subject of discussion and consultation. Moreover,
since prosecutors have claimed that the payment of attorneys' fees is relevant
to establish substantive elements of various federal offenses, it is clear that
there is a direct nexus between the amount and form of attorney fee pay-
ments and the subject matter of the professional consultation.
Comments on Regulations, supra note 8, at 26-27.
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tion between attorneys and their clients."112
VIII. THE APPEALABILITY OF A MOTION TO QUASH
The appealability of a motion to quash may be the determinative
factor for an attorney in deciding whether to contest a grand jury
subpoena. The general rule is that a court order denying a motion to
quash a subpoena is not appealable.11 3 Such an order is not consid-
ered "final" within the meaning of the final judgment rule.11 4 Nev-
ertheless, a party challenging the subpoena can resist the subpoena
and be found in contempt of court. A contempt citation will provide
an immediate appeal and thereby furnish an opportunity for review
of the lower court's order.1i 5
When a subpoena is directed to an attorney, often the client will
intervene and move or join in the attorney's motion to. quash the sub-
poena. The motion may be based upon the contention that the en-
forcement of the subpoena will violate the attorney-client privilege
or a constitutional right. A majority of the circuits have found that
in this unusual attorney-client scenario, the general rule does not ap-
ply.11 Under the Perlman exception,"i 7 the client can seek an im-
112. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
113. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). See also 9 J. MOORE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE § 110.13[2] (Ward ed. 1975); C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3914 (1976).
114. The policy behind the final judgment rule was explained in Cobbledick:
Finality as a condition of review is an historic characteristic of federal appel-
late procedure. It was written into the first Judiciary Act and has been de-
parted from only when observance of it would practically defeat the right to
any review at all .... To be effective, judicial administration must not be
leaden-footed. Its momentum would be arrested by permitting separate re-
views of the component elements in a unified cause. These considerations of
policy are especially compelling in the administration of criminal justice.
309 U.S. at 324-25.
115. United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 (1971).
116. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Gordon), 722 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1983);
In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 105 (4th Cir.), vacated and with-
drawn, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum
(Lahodny v. United States), 695 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings
(Lamore), 689I F.2d 1351 (11th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Malone), 655
F.2d 881 (8th Cir. 1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199 (5th Cir.
1981); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Katz), 623 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1980); In re Novem-
ber 1979 Grand Jury (Velsicol Chem. Co. v. United States), 616 F.2d 1021 (7th Cir.
1980); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 798 (3d Cir. 1979).
117. Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7 (1917). Perlman was the inventor of a
demountable rim used on automobile tires. His company brought a patent infringe-
ment action against Firestone Tire Company. At trial, Perlman was a witness for his
plaintiff-corporation. Some of his personal property related to the invention was en-
tered into evidence as exhibits. The case was later dismissed without prejudice upon
mediate appeal of an order without his attorney first placing himself
in contempt. The primary reason for this exception is that an attor-
ney cannot be "expected to risk a contempt citation in order to pro-
tect the interests of a powerless third party [i.e., his client]."118
Perhaps a more compelling rationale is that once an attorney testi-
fies, the "cat is out-of-the-bag"; that is, the information has been re-
vealed and the client will be denied effective appellate review at a
later date.
Three circuit courts have not found the majority's logic compelling.
These courts have declined to extend Perlman to the attorney-client
scenario where the client asserts only the attorney-client privilege, as
opposed to a constitutional claim.119 The minority finds any applica-
tion of Perlman misplaced. First, Perlman involved constitutional
rights.120 Second, Perlman did not consider the administrative im-
pact of interlocutory appeals upon today's already overcrowded ap-
pellate dockets.121 Third, Perlman can be restricted to its own
"unique" set of facts.122
The minority argues that "[a]n attorney, in his client's interest and
as proof of his own stout-heartedness, might be willing to defy a testi-
monial order and run the risk of a contempt proceeding."12 3 Attor-
neys have been the subject of contempt citations on behalf of their
clients.124 The minority suggests that an attorney risks a contempt
citation to protect his own pecuniary interests.125 As one commenta-
tor stated, "prospective clients will not flock to an attorney who is
the condition that the exhibits be impounded, sealed, and kept in the court clerk's cus-
tody. Later a court order was served upon counsel for both Perlman and Firestone.
The order required the attorneys to appear before the court and to show cause why
the United States Attorney should not take custody of the exhibits. The government
claimed the exhibits were required in order for a grand jury to indict Perlman for per-jury. Perlman, claiming fourth and fifth amendment privileges, independently peti-
tioned the court to restrain the clerk from releasing the exhibits. The petition was
denied, and Perlman appealed. The government moved to dismiss the appeal contend-
ing the order to be interlocutory. The Supreme Court rejected this argument and held
that Perlman could intervene to appeal the order. The Court later ruled against Perl-
man on the merits of his claim. IM at 14-15.
118. In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d 199, 202 (5th Cir. 1981).
119. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 723 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1983);
In re Sealed Case, 655 F.2d 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d 15 (1st
Cir. 1980).
120. Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13.
121. Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d at 18.
122. See supra note 117 for a discussion of the facts of Perlman. For instance, in
Perlman, it was the court clerk, as opposed to an attorney, who actually possessed the
exhibits. Since no court clerk would ever risk contempt for a litigant, Perlman was
truly "powerless to avert the mischief of the order." Perlman, 247 U.S. at 13.
123. In re Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d at 18.
124. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation No. 83-2-35, 723 F.2d 447 (6th Cir.
1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Freeman), 708 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1983); In re
Grand Jury Witness (Salas v. United States), 695 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 1982).
125. See, e.g., Sealed Case, 655 F.2d at 1301.
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known to surrender confidential information without a fight."126
This particular economic-based interest becomes even more persua-
sive in light of the existing forfeiture statutes now used to seize attor-
ney fees. Many attorneys might prefer to risk contempt rather than
risk the loss of their fees. Whether an attorney will protect his cli-
ent's interests when faced with the possibility of contempt is an open
question. However, this inquiry should not form the basis upon
which an appeal will or will not be granted. As the majority sug-
gests, the attorney's willingness to defend may depend upon the
value of the client's business and the client's power vis-a-vis the
attorney. 27
The minority contends that the client will not suffer any irrepara-
ble harm if the attorney complies with the subpoena as the client can
still object at trial to the introduction of any evidence that might vio-
late the attorney-client privilege.128 The minority believes that an
attorney or his client can obtain a review of the subpoena by petition
for writ of mandamus or prohibition.129 However, one of the courts
which has adopted the minority position and considered such review
has also summarily denied the attorney's petition, even in light of a
fifth amendment claim.130
Since many subpoena challenges are likely to be based upon both
constitutional claims and claims of the attorney-client privilege, the
majority position should prevail. Requiring an attorney to be found
in contempt raises a conflict of interest problem with the client. The
attorney's interest is to avoid a potential contempt citation. Thus, he
will be compelled either to comply with the subpoena or to expend
the fewest resources to resist it. In direct conflict with such action is
the client's interest in combating a possible indictment. It is within
the client's interest for his attorney to do his utmost to resist the sub-
poena.' 3 ' Thus, the Perlman exception should prevent the attorney
from being confronted with this unpleasant dilemma, even at the cost
of some unworthy appeals.
126. Comment, The Perlman Exception: Limitations Required By The Final Deci-
sion Rule, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 798, 813 (1982).
127. See, e.g., Grand Jury Proceedings (Fine), 641 F.2d at 202.
128. Oberkoetter, 612 F.2d at 17.
129. The minority concedes that such writs are a drastic remedy and should be
granted only by an appellate court upon a clear showing of abuse or judicial usurpation
by the lower court. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 723 F.2d 1461,
1466-67 (10th Cir. 1983).
130. See, e.g., Grand Jury Proceedings (Vargas), 723 F.2d at 1466-67.
131. Id.
IX. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE DISCLOSURE AND FORFEITURE
OF ATTORNEY FEES
As previously discussed, an attorney who brings a motion to quash
a grand jury subpoena upon the grounds that it violates the attorney-
client privilege may ultimately find himself either in contempt or tes-
tifying before the grand jury. However, if an attorney brings a mo-
tion to quash upon the grounds that his client's sixth amendment
right will be violated, he may successfully evade the subpoena. An
attorney may argue three possible sixth amendment violations: "[1]
the mere disclosure of the fee arrangement itself; [2] the effect of re-
sponding to the subpoena on the ability of counsel to prepare for
trial; and [3] the effect of counsel testifying and the result of being
forced to withdraw as trial counsel in th[e] case."132 The actual for-
feiture of attorney fees may raise a fourth possible sixth amendment
claim, i.e., the right to counsel of one's own choice.'3 3 It is not possi-
ble within the limits of this article to present the lengthy analysis re-
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985 (Payden v. United States), 605
F. Supp. 839, 845 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
133. This argument has been recently raised in United States v. Sheehan, CR-F-84-
198, a case currently filed in the federal disrict court in Fresno, California. In Sheehan,
the government stated in the indictment that all attorney's fees would be forfeited.
Later, after a hearing on the matter, the government withdrew this forfeiture of attor-
ney's fees clause, but it replaced the clause with a "catch-all clause" that could include
attorney's fees. This case goes beyond previous cases in that the government has re-
quested attorneys to testify against their clients at trial about their fee arrangements.
Brian Leighton, the United States Attorney working on the case, claims that the gov-
ernment is "not denying anybody the right to an attorney. We're just saying that a
drug dealer should have to use his hard-earned money like anyone else to hire a law-
yer. It's the attorneys who have priced themselves out of the market." See Eisler,
Court Test Looms on Federal Seizing of Lawyers'Fees, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 1,
col. 2.
Leighton filed the indictment against Sheehan and Broh, claiming both were part-
ners in drug trafficking. The defendants retained two attorneys: Sonnett and Krieger.
Sonnett was formerly a president of the Dade County Bar Association and a United
States Attorney.
Sonnett claims that "the government is already a Goliath, choosing the venue of the
trial and utilizing the unlimited resources of federal agencies. Now Goliath is moving
to control and nationalize the sling in David's hands [i.e., the defense attorneys]." L.A.
Daily J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 18.
Leighton has responded:
I wonder who Goliath is. We have to get search warrants, we can't invade the
attorney-client privilege, the defendant has all these protections and now they
are trying to use this fee mechanism to keep money that is made illegally.
They aren't saying the government doesn't have the right to seize vehicles,
boats, planes, just let the attorneys keep their money."
L.A. Daily J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 18.
Sonnett refutes this argument by finding that the prosecutor's logic "turns the pre-
sumption on its head. The allegation simply denies anybody accused of a drug crime
the right to hire an attorney." L.A. Daily J., Apr. 5, 1985, at 18.
The Sheehan case is still pending before United States District Judge Coyle. The fee
issue has temporarily been dropped. A former law clerk of Judge Coyle, Ms. Kay
Shaffer, is currently preparing an extensive study of the sixth amendment as related
[Vol. 13: 791, 1986] Grand Jury Subpoena
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
quired for each of these four areas. But, some of the current cases in
this area will be explored in order to illustrate the scope of the issues
and the important problems they raise.
If the Second Circuit's decision in the case of In re Shargel was a
victory for prosecutors, then In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served
Upon Doe (Roe v. United States)134 was a triumph for the defense
bar. The facts of Doe are similar to Shargel. In Doe, a member of an
alleged New York organized crime family became the target of a
grand jury investigation. 3 5 His attorney was summoned by the
grand jury to produce records of fees and property received by coun-
sel on behalf of twenty-one individuals who were "benefactees" and
alleged members of the client's "crew." The attorney brought a mo-
tion to quash contesting the government's showing of relevance or
need. He also claimed that the subpoena was being used as an "'ulti-
mate weapon' to disqualify him from the case."136 The lower court
denied his motion to quash. It found the information relevant and
that the "possibility of the lawyer's eventual disqualification was far
outweighed by the importance of presenting the evidence to the
grand jury.":t37
In reversing the lower court, the appeals court unequivocally re-
jected any claim to the attorney-client privilege.138 Instead, the court
addressed the issue of whether a prosecutor must make a "prelimi-
nary showing of relevance and need for the attorney's testimony and
records."139 In order to decide this question, the court addressed the
sixth amendment claim that the client was entitled to counsel of his
choice if he was ultimately indicted.
to the forfeiture of attorneys' fees, which will be published in the near future by the
Texas Law Review. Telephone interview with Kay Shaffer (Oct. 16, 1985).
In United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 183 (D.C. Ill. 1985), the government
also issued a trial subpoena duces tecum to a defense attorney. The subpoena re-
quested the attorney to produce all documents related to his fee arrangement with his
client. The subpoena was served ten months after the client's indictment and six
months after his attorney appeared in the case. The court held the government failed
to show the relevance and the need for the requested fee information. Id, at 188. Fur-
thermore, if the attorney had been compelled to produce the records, he would have
also been forced to withdraw from the matter. This threat of withdrawal at this stage
in the case "would have a[n] ... impact on [the client's] sixth amendment right." Id
at 187.
134. 759 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1985).
135. Id. at 970.
136. Id
137. Id
138. Id at 975. In fact, the court explicitly distinguished the attorney-client privi-
lege cases from Doe. Id.
139. Id. at 971-72.
The court found that when the attorney was called as a witness
against his client, "the government [was] surely setting the stage for
the attorney's ultimate disqualification." 140 Therefore, the govern-
ment must make a preliminary showing of relevance and reasonable
need. The court also recognized the competing interests of the grand
jury and the attorney-client relationship. First, the court acknowl-
edged that "the unbridled use of the subpoena would potentially al-
low the Government ... to decide unilaterally that an attorney will
not represent his client."'14 1 It was this potential power of disqualifi-
cation that disturbed the court. Without an independent defense bar,
the adversarial system of criminal justice would collapse.
Secondly, the court determined that any potential infringement on
the right to counsel "must only be as a last resort."142 The right to
counsel precludes the arbitrary dismissal of one's attorney. Previous
cases ruling that the party challenging the subpoena bore the initial
burden were distinguished as not involving any constitutional rights
or testimonial evidence. But, the court went even further to com-
ment that "even where no constitutional rights are implicated, this
circuit has no per se rule against placing the burden on the party
seeking to enforce the subpoena."143 Such language would suggest
that where only the attorney-client privilege is raised, the prosecutor
will carry the initial burden of showing relevance and need.
In one sense, Doe is a limited ruling since it pertained to a case
where both the prosecutor and the defense attorney agreed that if
the attorney who had served as the client's counsel for many years
was compelled to go before the grand jury, he would, in fact, be ulti-
mately disqualified. Nonetheless, Doe represents a major break-
through for the defense bar.
The government's power to enforce a grand jury subpoena against
an attorney was also circumscribed by the First Circuit in In re
Grand Jury Matters.144 In Matters, both federal and state authorities
investigated certain persons who later were indicted for drug of-
fenses. While the commencement of the state trial was pending, a
federal grand jury issued subpoenas to the defendants' attorneys re-
quiring them to produce information regarding their attorneys' fees.
It should be noted that the federal grand jury was investigating the
same activities for which the clients had been indicted in state court.
The attorneys contested the subpoenas on the grounds that they vio-
140. Id. at 973.
141. Id. at 975.
142. Id.
143. Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe, 759 F.2d 968, 976 (1984). For an ear-
lier ruling contrary in result, see In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated Jan. 2, 1985
(Payden v. United States), 605 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
144. 751 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1984).
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lated the attorney-client privilege and the sixth amendment right to
counsel. Typically, the court found no infringement of the attorney-
client privilege. 145 However, the court did find that the timing of
these subpoenas could adversely affect the attorneys' "ability to pre-
pare and present their clients' defense in the pending state criminal
action."146 The court affirmed the trial court's decision to quash the
subpoenas upon the belief that the clients' sixth amendment rights
would be jeopardized and that the timing of the subpoenas was
burdensome.
Like the .Doe court, the Matters court carefully limited its ruling to
the "highly unusual"'147 facts presented therein. It was the use of the
subpoenas as a form of "harassment" that influenced the court not to
compel their enforcement. Nonetheless, the government was not
prevented from later renewing the subpoenas upon a showing of rele-
vance and need.
Both Doe and Matters indicate that where a constitutional right is
implicated, the courts will review the subpoenas more carefully and
may impose an initial, higher standard of need and relevancy upon
the governraent.148 Additionally, both courts perceived some conflict
of interest problems between the attorney and his client. For in-
stance, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility requires that if
an attorney is called as a witness against his client, the attorney may
continue to represent the client "until it appears that his testimony is
145. Id. at 17.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 18. The court remarked that the timing of these subpoenas "could be
taken as a veiled threat" by the government, and there was a finding of harassment by
the lower court. Id.
148. The circuits are in disagreement as to what the government's prima facie
showing must be where the attorney-client privilege is at issue. At one point, the
Third Circuit required the government to make an initial showing of relevancy and
materiality. See, e.g., In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1 (Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005 (4th
Cir.), vacated, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield I),
486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963 (3d
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015 (1975). Note that Schofield was initially followed
in the Fourth Circuit, but later abandoned.
Other circuits have rejected the Schofield test. For instance, the Sixth Circuit held
that the goverament does not have to show the information sought is minimally rele-
vant to the gramd jury investigation until the party who seeks to quash the subpoena
makes a showing of irrelevancy or prosecutorial abuse. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Sub-
poena 84-1-24 (Battle), 748 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit has also refused to require the government to make a showing of
need. See, e.g... In re Ousterhoudt, 722 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1983). Instead, a legitimate
purpose can be "derived from the fact that the subpoena is necessary to a legitimate
pursuit and the presumption that the government obeys the law." Hodge & Zweig, 548
F.2d 1347, 1354 (9th Cir. 1977).
or may be prejudicial to his client."' 49 Since revealing fee informa-
tion may lead to indictment of the client, it is certainly prejudicial
and will require the attorney to withdraw from the case. Thus, when
an attorney is compelled to become a witness against his client at the
grand jury stage, an effective "wedge" is driven between the attorney
and the client.150
The government's attempts to subject attorneys' fees to forfeiture
have caused a few district courts to consider a final sixth amendment
issue regarding the seizure of these fees.151 For example, in United
States v. Rogers, 152 the government brought a thirty count indictment
against certain defendants under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act. The indictment also alleged forfeiture under
the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984.153 At the same time the
indictment was filed, the government filed a petition for an order re-
straining other property transfers. The defendants thereafter
brought motions to protect attorneys' fees from forfeiture. The court
held that assets "legitimately transferred to attorneys in return for
services rendered"154 were not subject to forfeiture.
The defendants also claimed that the required "subsection (m)"
hearing155 threatened the attorney-client privilege. The hearing
would chill communications between an attorney and his client. The
court found that the hearing would require the attorney to disclose
his "knowledge about the scope and source of the defendant's as-
sets."1 5 6 It was these particular disclosures that would become the
heart of the government's case. These disclosures had such a signifi-
cant role in later proceedings that they went "far beyond the excep-
tion to [the] attorney client privilege. .... "157The very threat of
disclosure would chill communications between the attorney and his
149. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-102(B)(1979). The full
text of DR 5-102(B) reads:
If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a
lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm may be called as a
witness other than on behalf of his client, he may continue the representation
until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his client.
Id.
150. Grand Jury Matters, 751 F.2d at 19 (quoting In re Special Grand Jury No. 81-1
(Harvey), 676 F.2d 1005, 1009 (4th Cir.), vacated, 697 F.2d 112 (4th Cir. 1982)).
151. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985); United States v.
Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
152. 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Colo. 1985).
153. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (West Supp. 1985).
154. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
155. Under a subsection (m) hearing, any person asserting a legal interest in the
property which the government ordered to be forfeited has to show that he is "a bona
fide purchaser for value of the right, title, or interest in the property and was at the
time of the purchase reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject
to forfeiture ... ." 18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(m) (West Supp. 1985).
156. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349.
157. Id.
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client and would infringe the sixth amendment right to counsel.158
Perhaps the court's primary concern was the general impact that
the seizure of attorney fees would have upon the adversary process.
The government contended that when a person had no legitimate as-
sets and he could not afford counsel of his own choice, he would still
be entitled to a court-appointed lawyer. The court dismissed this ar-
gument. The government expended
significaat resources to prosecute these cases. Adequate defense . . . re-
quire[d] representation during grand jury investigations lasting as long as two
or three years. Counsel appointed ninety or one hundred and twenty days
before trial is patently inadequate. It is not consistent with due process to cre-
ate a situation which eliminates the adversary from the adversary process. 15 9
Rogers was regarded as the first "major breakthrough" for lawyers
who were having difficulty in keeping their fees. However, the
United States Department of Justice maintains that this decision was
wrong.16o Jeffrey S. Gordon, the attorney who represented Rogers,
commented that "lawyers would be defenseless to try to defend their
fees, especially if you have the burden of proof [under RICO] .... It
would completely destroy the attorney-client relationship."161 The
government's position is that Gordon exaggerates. "I don't know of
any case in which this office has attempted to use forfeiture provi-
sions to remove a defense attorney from a case," explained Richard
Drooyan, Chief Assistant U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles.' 6 2
The rationale of Rogers (that the sixth amendment right to counsel
would be violated if attorneys' fees were forfeitable) has been fol-
lowed in mother district court.163 The Criminal Justice section of
158. Id. There is currently a lawsuit pending in the District of Colorado challeng-
ing the constitutionality of the currency reporting law as applied to attorneys. Saint
Velti v. Department of the Treasury, No. 85-K-501. This case has been assigned to
Judge Kane, author of the Rogers opinion. In Saint Velti, the Treasury Department
moved to dismiss the declaratory relief action. The government argued the currency
reporting requirement did not impinge upon the sixth amendment or other rights.
The court has not yet ruled on the motion. Letter from Mark 0. Heaney to Tara
Flanagan (Oct. 16, 1985) (discussing the Currency Reporting Law). Mr. Heaney, an at-
torney in Los Angeles, is Co-Chairman of the Special Committee to Study the Cur-
rency Transaction Reporting Law of the National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers.
159. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. at 1349-50.
160. Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3002.
161. Judge Bars Seizure of Attorney's Fees Under RICO Law, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 20,
1985, at 1. Note that Rogers is not appealable. Telephone interview with Ms. Cathy
Nulty, Law Clerk to District Court Judge Kane (Oct. 16, 1985).
162. L.A. Daily J., Feb. 20, 1985, at 1.
163. United States v. Javello, No. 585 CR 115 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 1985) (Chief Judge
Motley) (slip opinion available on LEXIS, September 1985). See also, United States v.
Badalementi, 614 F. Supp. 194 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For a contrary view, see United States
the American Bar Association also disapproves of the use of the for-
feiture provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984
as used against attorneys' fees. 16 4 As to the opposition, recent guide-
lines issued by the United States Department of Justice regarding
the forfeiture of attorney fees reemphasize the government's
"hardline position concerning the government's right to all proceeds
of racketeering and drug activity."16 5
X. CONCLUSION
Has the grand jury subpoena, as addressed to defense counsel, be-
come the prosecutor's ultimate weapon? Today the attorney-client
privilege will not shield the attorney from being compelled to reveal
both the identity of his clients and fee information. But the invoca-
tion of the sixth amendment right to counsel and to counsel of choice
may in some limited circumstances exempt an attorney from testify-
ing before the grand jury. If the very timing of the subpoena raises
v. One Parcel of Land, 614 F. Supp. 183 (D.C. Ill. 1985) (attorney fees/costs of litigation
incurred by criminal defendant involved in drug activities could not be excluded from
forfeiture under Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, 21
U.S.C. § 881).
164. Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association, Report to the House of
Delegates, submitted by Chairperson Paul L. Smith, July, 1985.
165. See Justice Department Guidelines, supra note 17, at 3001. These new guide-
lines provide that any grand jury or trial subpoena issued to an attorney for informa-
tion relating to the representation of a client must be authorized by the Assistant
Attorney General, Criminal Division. The government guidelines state that, with re-
gard to the issuance of a subpoena, certain requirements for fee information can be
easily met. First, the information is relevant. Id. at 3007. The information is relevant
because:
[i]t may prove unexplained wealth which is relevant to show that a defendant
obtained substantial income from his illegal activities. It may show that the
fee for one or more alleged conspirators was paid by another co-conspirator
which is relevant to prove 'association in fact' or may lead to the discovery of
other co-conspirators. Finally, it may show the disposition of forfeitable assets
or lead to the discovery of forfeitable assets which have been hidden by a
defendant.
Id.
A second requirement is that reasonable attempts must be made to obtain the infor-
mation from other sources.
A third requirement is that there exist reasonable grounds to believe the informa-
tion is reasonably needed. With regard to forfeiture, the government concludes "that
there must be a basis to conclude that there are assets subject to forfeiture which have
not been identified or located." Id. Such a basis would exist where the defendant
probably obtained his income from illegal sources "and he had no substantial legiti-
mate income at the time the fee was paid." Id.
The fourth, and final requirement, is that "the need for the information must out-
weigh the potential adverse effects on the attorney-client relationship." Id.
With regard to the forfeiture of attorneys' fees, the guidelines do allow for agree-
ments to exempt fees from forfeiture. Id. at 3008. The amount of the fee alone will
not determine if it will be exempt. "The focus must be on whether it is a legitimate
transaction or a sham transaction designed to shield assets from forfeiture. If the
transaction is legitimate, the fee, even if it appears exorbitant, may be exempted if it is
paid from a source that meets the first requirement." Id.
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issues regarding effective counsel, an attorney may not be compelled
to comply with a grand jury subpoena.
There are numerous ethical considerations which pose a dilemma
for an attorney served with a grand jury subpoena. Generally, the
various state bar associations have maintained that revealing fee in-
formation seriously jeopardizes the attorney-client relationship. And,
although an attorney must vigorously represent his client's interests,
he may be unwilling to suffer contempt in order to have an immedi-
ate appeal of a denial of a motion to quash.
Finally, the courts have only begun to address the complex ques-
tion of whether the actual forfeiture of attorneys' fees conflicts with
the defendant's sixth amendment right. 166 As a practical matter, if
the attorneys' fees become subject to forfeiture in the early or middle
stage of criminal proceedings and the attorney withdraws, undue de-
lay may result and the system may incur additional expenses in find-
ing qualified, court-appointed counsel. Such administrative concerns
cannot be lightly dismissed in a system already plagued with case
backlogs and delays. Whether these administrative and constitu-
tional concerns will ultimately prevail over the government's interest
in the enforcement of the forfeiture statutes remains to be seen.
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166. For a concise article on this topic, see Weintraub, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees
Under the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act, 22 GA. ST. B.J. 67 (Nov. 1985).

